ABSTRACT: Based on Goyal and Joshi, we study a setting with many countries, in which there are firms that can sell in the domestic as well as foreign markets , and assumed that each firm compete to take the form of non-price, and analysis the incentive of country to sign FTA with other countries via Classical Competition Model. Our principal finding is that 1)two isolated countries have no incentive to sign an FTA, and the empty network is stable. 2) The complete trading network is stable if ; 3) There is no improving path from the empty network to the complete network .
Introduction
FTA as bilateral trade agreements between countries has played a huge advantage, and become an important means to achieve the globalization of trade.
In order to investigate technical in the role of the FTA partner countries market makers occupation，the authors introduced the classic competition model. Each firm only concerns the market share in their own country and the FTA partner countries, and have complete information of other firms in technology spending. In the course of repeated games, technology spending of each firm finally reached equilibrium. In previous papers, Goyal and Joshi (2006) assumed that in each country there is a single firm producing a homogeneous good and competing as a Cournot oligopolist in all countries. A lot of follow-up research expand Goyal and Joshi(2006) . Such as, Chen and Joshi(2010) considered the decision of the country to enter into an FTA is also crucially dependent on the participating countries' existing FTA relationships with third countries. In another example, Mauleon, Song and Vannetelbosch(2010) studied whether trade unions in different countries influence on global FTA network formation. In another example, Daisuke and Furusawa (2014) and Zhang, Cui and Zu (2014) studied dynamic evolution of FTA networks by introducing the dynamic analysis. Different from the existing literature, We assume that firms adopt technology investment strategy to compete in the same market.
In their lay articles Goyal and Joshi find that if countries are symmetric, a complete network is consistent with the incentives of individual countries. In other words, the complete network is stable. Furusawa and Konishi based on Goyal and Joshi lay articles also find that the complete network is stable. Zhang, Cui and Zu analysis the dynamic FTA networks, and find that the complete network is stable, if 3 N ≥ . Cui and Gao studied a free trade agreement network formation game where bilateral free trade agreements imply unrestricted FDI, and finds that star FTA network is pairwise stable. In this article, we find that (1)any two independent states has no incentive to sign FTA and (2)the complete networks is stable, if 4 N ≥ .
The basic model
We consider a setting with N countries, each of which has one firm producing a homogeneous good, A represent R&D investment of firm i in country j . We let the output of firm j in country i be denoted by j i Q . We assume that each firm only concerned with its market share in FTA partner countries and in their own country. In general, in each country
, each country faces an function of income given by
The relationship between output of firm j in country i and the investment of R&D is given by
Among them, other countries' R&D investment in country i is expressed as
A g will be denoted by
A . For further, we assume that the relationship between the market share of firm j in country i and the R&D investment is given by
On the relationship between the market share of firm and the R&D investment, we can obtain the following properties. Proof. For (2) is carried out first derivation on The income function of i in country j can be obtained from (1)and (2):
To obtain the best technology investment，income function ( )
Therefore，we can get the optimal R&D investment of each firm
Known by the above formula, if ( ) 1 i g η = ， the optimal R&D investment of firm is 0 . However, each firm's R&D expenditure will reach the maximum, if ( ) 2 i g η = . The income function of i in country j can be obtained from (3)and (4):
For future,
S is decrease function with respect to ( ) i g η which means that as a country forms more trade agreements and more foreign firms become active in its home market, the social welfare of firms in this market is decreasing.
From (5) we can obtain the social welfare of country i .
The stable and efficient networks
We employ a relatively weak notion of stability that is based on the idea that although FTAs are formed bilaterally, they can be severed unilaterally. We have borrowed this definition of stable networks from Goyal and Joshi（2006）:
In words, a stable networks means that any country , i i N ∈ in a stable network FTA has no incentive to sever an existing FTA with another, and any countries , i i N ∈ that are not involved in an FTA have no incentive to form an agreement.
(1) When the country i and country j to sign an new FTA, it will form new FTA network ij g g + . Therefore, the social welfare of country i is given by Therefore, the social welfare of country i is given by
The marginal returns to country i from severing a link with country j are now given by Thus, the social welfare of country i will reduce, when the country i and country j to sign a new FTA. The same reason, when the country j and country i to sign a new FTA, the social welfare of country j will reduce. Therefore, the empty trading network is stable.
For any country in the empty network, it will occupy all of the market. However, when the country i and country j to sign an new FTA, the firm of country i will lose the entire market as long as the firm of country j have a little technology investment. Thus, in order to compete for the market share, they will continue to increase R&D investment. When the two firms achieve the optimal R&D investment, market share will be split. In this case the R&D investment of each firm is greater than 0 , so each country has no incentive to sever an existing FTA with another. 
Conclusion
Our interest has been in the following question: What structure of FTA is consistent with the incentives of individual countries? We have developed a simple model of network formation to analyze this question. Based on Goyal and Joshi, we assumed that each firm competes for market share only by R&D investment via Classical Competition Model and find that no country has incentive to sign FTA with other country if the country is isolated. Therefore, the empty FTA network is stable. However, the complete network is still stable. Thus, the best choice for each country is that they doesn't sign ant FTA with other country. Otherwise, it has to try to sign FTA with other country to reduce the social welfare losses. However, we find that there is no improving path from the empty network to the complete network.
